ABSTRACT: This paper describes the development of the deposit bank in Europe to 1600. Deposit banks allowed customers to make payments by transferring deposits on the books of the bank rather than by settling in coin. The paper describes how such payments were made and what kinds of transactions they were used for. Deposit banks developed into financial intermediaries, and the paper examines their liabilities, their assets, the methods they used to manage liquidity and risk, and the regulation to which they were subject. The authorities responded to increasingly frequent failures of deposit banks by establishing public banks.
INTRODUCTION
4 agents: it seems to have been mainly in this connection that the written order of payment, or polizza, was used. 10 In Florence employers would pay their workers with polizze, which the workers could take to the bank to receive payment in cash; a contractor might make a cash deposit and draw on it in this way over several months to pay his workers. 11 Deposit bankers often did not engage in international banking-in foreign exchange and remittance. In Venice and Bruges, as in most other cities, deposit banking was a purely local business and deposit bankers lacked the network of branches or agents in foreign cities required for international banking. However, in Genoa and Barcelona, deposit bankers did engage in international banking. In Florence, some of the great merchant bankers, such as the Peruzzi and the Medici, did themselves operate local deposit banks, so the two businesses were not always distinct.
The intensity of use of bank deposits was low by modern standards. In fourteenthcentury Venice, a large cotton importer averaged about 25-30 transactions per year, on about 20 business days; another smaller merchant 140-150 transactions per year on 75-100 business days. 12 A Bruges bank in the fourteenth century recorded on successive days 6 transactions, 4, 39, and 32. 13 Even this low volume of transactions kept banks busy. Assuming that each transaction took 15 minutes, a business day of 5 or 6 hours would enable a teller to handle no more than 20 or so transactions.
There is little evidence on the fees that deposit bankers charged for their services.
Banks did not keep cash accounts, so no records remain of their fees. It is known that in Venice deposit banks did charge a fee for each transfer, and it seems plausible that this was the normal practice elsewhere. 14 There was often an additional fee or agio for cash withdrawals, including an exchange fee if withdrawal was in coin other than that in which the deposit was denominated (for example, in gold rather than silver). Deposits subject to transfer did not pay explicit interest, and it is possible that some services would have been provided 'free' to depositors as implicit interest on their deposits. On the other practice in 1437: they regarded the private banks as competitors and they may have been worried about the potential threat to the liquidity of the Taula. See Usher (1943) . 10 In its legal form, the polizza was more like a modern giro payment than a check: unlike a check, it was not negotiable, so that the payee could not assign it to another party (for example, to his own bank) for collection.
11 Goldthwaite (1985) 12 Mueller (1997) p20-21 13 de Roover (1948) 14 Mueller (1979) ; Mueller (1977) hand, the prohibitions on usury made it difficult to charge explicit interest on loans, and disguising interest as fees was one obvious alternative.
DEPOSIT BANKING AS ASSIGNMENT OF DEBTS
One way to think about deposit banking is as a way of improving the efficiency of payment in coin. However, there is an alternative, and perhaps more illuminating interpretation-to see it as an extension of a system of payment by the assignment of debt.
Commercial transactions were almost never spot or cash transactions: they almost always involved credit and deferred payment. 15 Given the scarcity of cash and the inconvenience in its use, it was common to settle a debt not in cash but by assigning to the creditor a debt owed to the debtor by a third party. This was normally done via the books of the parties involved. 16 A debt might be assigned in this way in payment several times until it eventually came due and was paid in cash or until it was assigned in payment to the debtor himself and was thereby extinguished. Of course, the assignment of a debt was acceptable as a means of payment only if the third party was known to the creditor and considered a good credit. In closed commercial communities, where everyone knew everyone else, this was not a problem. However, in major commercial centers where trade with strangers predominated, payment by assignment of debts could work only if those debts were the debts of a third party known and trusted by all. The deposit bank was such a third party.
Assigning the debt of a deposit bank-a bank deposit-in payment had further advantages. Because the debt of the same third party was assigned in many payments there was greater opportunity for netting-extinguishing one debt with another. 17 Because bank deposits were so useful as a means of settlement, depositors were happy to keep them rather than convert them immediately into cash. The result was that bank deposits could be used to mediate a large volume of transactions with very little need for final settlement in cash. The usefulness of deposit transfer as a means of payment was further enhanced by the willingness of deposit banks to grant overdraft credit. That is, if a 15 See Kohn (1999a and 1999b) 16 The assignment of book credit as a means of settlement had already been recognized under Roman law, which had accepted an entry in the book of a creditor as sufficient evidence of the discharge of a debt.
The law recognized transfers on the books of ordinary merchants as well as on those of the argentarii (silversmiths), the Roman equivalent of bankers.
17 Assignment of debt by transfer on the books of the parties was 'by no means exclusively applicable to bankers… The distinctive service of the banker lay in the centralization of these operations and in the consequent increase in the scope of the system of book transfers." (Usher (1934) p10) depositor had insufficient funds in his account, the bank would grant him a loan to allow him to settle. Credit is a vital lubricant of any settlement process: it reduces the danger that a participant will be unable to meet his own obligations because of delays in payments due to him. Overdraft credit from deposit banks enabled merchants to manage their liquidity with much smaller reserves than they would otherwise have needed.
The purest expression of deposit banking as assignment of debt was to be found in the banks of the great medieval fairs. The great fairs were the centers of long-distance trade, periodically bringing together merchants from many lands for several weeks of intensive and highly structured trading. The model for all later fairs were the thirteenth-century fairs of Champagne. At Champagne, trading was divided into two main periods. The first period was devoted to the sale of cloth: the sellers were predominantly from Flanders, the buyers from Italy. The second period was devoted mainly to the sale of oriental spices and drugs: here the roles were reversed, with the Italians the sellers and the Flemings the buyers. 18 The fair banks provided the payments system that made this trading structure possible. In the first period, the Italians 'paid' for their purchases of cloth by transferring to the Flemish sellers credits on the books of the fair banks; payment was final in that the banks guaranteed settlement. In the second period, Flemish merchants used the credits they had accumulated in the first period to pay for their own purchases of spices and drugs.
The credits used in payment were not really 'deposits'. Although evidence is scarce, it seems the Italians did not begin by depositing coin with the bankers. 19 Rather, the bankers created the credits on their books by allowing Italian merchants to overdraw their accounts during the first period of trading; these overdrafts were then largely extinguished by payments the Italians received during the second period of trading. 20 Consistent with this interpretation, 'deposits' at the fair banks were not payable on demand, but only during the settlement period that followed the two periods of trading.
At that time, merchants with credit balances could, if they wished, receive payment in cash. Conversely, merchants with debit balances had to cover them. They could do so with cash or with bills of exchange, but it was common practice to carry the unpaid balance over to the following fair. This might be done by the banker agreeing to extend the overdraft loan or by the merchant borrowing from another who had a credit balance with the bankers. To facilitate this practice, there soon developed an active market in 'inter-fair deposits' (dépôts de foire en foire).
During the thirteenth century, the borrowing and lending that surrounded settlement at the fairs of Champagne evolved into a general money market-a market for short term loans. Not only the traders themselves, but others seeking short-term credit or having funds they were willing to lend short-term, came to the fairs to borrow and lend.
Moreover, the convenient settlement arrangements and the ease of reinvesting funds or refinancing loans, made the fairs an ideal place for the settlement of debts wherever they were contracted-from London to Genoa. In particular, the fairs became a center for the market in bills of exchange. Indeed, the fairs of Champagne continued to be an important center of financial settlement long after they lost their importance in trade-a pattern that was to be repeated with later fairs, such as those of Lyons.
The fair banks, therefore, provided a sophisticated system of clearing and settlement that handled an enormous volume of trade, and later on an even greater volume of financial transactions, with only the minimal use of coin or bullion. There is evidence that the intention to economize on the use of coin was an important motivation for the establishment of the fairs by the Count of Flanders in the late twelfth century: at that time, trade with France was severely hampered by a scarcity of coin. 21
THE EXTENT OF DEPOSIT BANKING
Deposit banks provided a system of clearing and settlement not only for the great fairs but also for the great commercial cities of the period such as Genoa, Venice, Bruges, and Barcelona. 22 Genoa was probably where deposit banking originated some time in the their debts." ( de Roover (1954) p204) . The bankers at Champagne were themselves from northwest Italy, predominantly from Asti and Piacenza (see Abulafia (1997) Where deposit banks existed, non-merchant locals took advantage of them. In fourteenthcentury Bruges, "every merchant, every broker, every innkeeper, and every drapier had
[an account], and probably also a good many high-class retailers such as mercers, furriers, and goldsmiths, not to mention nobles and other persons who were not in business at all." 24 Consequently, in the commercial centers, the use of deposit banks was quite widespread: in Venice in 1500, one in six to ten heads of household had a bank account; in Bruges in the fourteenth century, one in eight; in Barcelona in 1433, one in three. 25 By the fourteenth century, in all the centers of international trade and finance, whether they were fairs or commercial cities, payment in bank predominated. It did so because it was well suited to the nature of transactions in these places. 26 The need for 22 Antwerp, which was the predominant commercial center at the end of our period did not rely on deposit banks for clearing. The reasons for this will become clear presently. See Kohn (1999c) on how Antwerp adapted to the lack of deposit banks.
23 Mueller (1997) both parties to be present to effect a payment was no inconvenience in a trading center where they were present anyhow to trade with one another. The cost of payment in bank was higher than the cost of payment in coin except for large transactions: the cost of payment in coin increased with the size of the payment; the cost of payment in bank was high-mostly in time and trouble-but it was largely a fixed cost independent of the size of the payment. International commerce and finance generated a substantial volume of large transactions. The volume itself further increased the efficiency of payment in bank by increasing the opportunity for netting, so further reducing the need for settlement in cash.
The most important reason why payment in bank was a good fit was that trade in the major international centers was trade among strangers. Where trade was among locals who knew each other well and had easy recourse in the event of default, there was no need for payment in bank: merchants could easily settle transactions on their own books, assigning third-party debts as necessary. However, strangers could not do this: they needed a trusted third party, in the form of deposit banks, to settle their transactions.
Outside the centers of international trade and finance, deposit banking was either much less developed or completely absent. While deposit banks were indispensable in Genoa and Venice, they were of only minor importance in Lucca and Florence, even though these two cities were the home of many of the deposit bankers active in other cities. Lucca and Florence themselves were manufacturing centers rather than trading centers. Consequently, commercial and financial transactions in these cities involved locals rather than strangers, so there was no need to settle through a trusted third party.
While deposit banks certainly existed in these cities, they were small and served mainly a 'cashier' function: their transactions were mostly cash withdrawals and deposits rather than transfers in bank. 27 Similarly, in Flanders, deposit banking was important only in 26 "…there seems to be ground for believing that the increase in banking activity during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is largely due to the new business in foreign exchange." (Usher (1934) 
B. DEPOSIT BANKS AS INTERMEDIARIES
The primary economic importance of deposit banks lay in their role as payments institutions: "…banking on the European continent, prior to 1800, was not based upon discount, but upon foreign and local exchange. Even credit, considered today the main function of the banks, was incidental to exchange." 31 However, deposit banks were, by their nature, also financial intermediaries: they borrowed in their own name and re-lent to others. Financial intermediation grew naturally out of their payments function, which, as we have seen, involved the extension of overdraft credit. To understand how deposit banks functioned as financial intermediaries, we begin by examining the sources of their funds and the uses to which they put them.
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
The principal source of funds for deposit banks, of course, was their deposits.
However in order for deposits to be a source of funds-to be available for lending-they had to be seen as a loan to the bank rather than as valuables consigned for safekeeping.
Medieval law, relying on Roman precedent, did recognize this distinction. A consignment of valuables for safekeeping was called a depositum regulare. Such a deposit was nonlocated more conveniently for transfer banking. By the sixteenth century, Florence had 'caught up' in the area of deposit banking (see Cipolla (1989) ): presumably, by then, the circumstances had changed to demand it.
fungible: the precise object consigned had to be restored on demand. In the event of bankruptcy, a regular deposit was fully recoverable by the owner, and general creditors of the consignee had no claim on it. In contrast, a depositum irregulare was fungible:
equivalent rather than identical objects were to be returned. In the event of bankruptcy, an irregular deposit had the same legal standing as other general liabilities. The deposits of banks were considered to be irregular deposits. 32
Bank deposits came in two main varieties-current accounts and 'conditioned accounts'. It was the current accounts that were used as a means of payment. They could arise either from the deposit of cash, by transfer from another account, or by the granting of a loan by the bank. Current accounts did not normally pay an explicit return, although the payment services provided by the bank did provide an implicit return to the depositor. Conditioned accounts, on the other hand, were a type of trust or escrow account, payable by the bank only on the fulfillment of some pre-specified condition; they were therefore not normally transferable in payment. In Venice, banks accepted conditioned deposits to be paid, for example, on the coming of age of a son, on the dowering of a daughter, or on the issuing of a court decision. In Barcelona, it was common in executing real estate and commercial contracts to deposit money to the credit of a notary, to be transferred by him to a designated party as soon as certain conditions were met. Conditioned accounts could make up a significant fraction of a bank's total deposits. Because of their stability and relatively long term, they were particularly suitable as a basis for long-term lending or investment by the bank. Conditioned accounts did normally pay a return. However, because of the prohibition of usury, the return was usually at a variable rate linked to the bank's profits rather than at a fixed rate of interest. 33
Although current and conditioned deposits constituted their main source of funds, deposit banks also raised funds in other ways. They often accepted term deposits with a fixed maturity-typically, from three to twelve months. In some cities, such term deposits paid a contractual rate of interest: in Lucca, 12% was recognized by statute as a legal return. However, because of usury considerations, the more common practice was a voluntary dividend 'at the discretion' of the bank (in Florence, the rate fluctuated between 8% and 10%). Term deposits were not unique to banks: any large business might accept a deposito a discrezione. Indeed, until the development of a corporate bond market 31 de Roover (1954) p 236 in the nineteenth century, term deposits were the most common form of medium-term business debt.
Deposit banks also raised funds through non-deposit liabilities. Lenders often preferred to lend via formal loan agreements, which provided some distinct advantages over deposits. A formal loan could specify guarantors who would pay if the bank failed, allowing the lender to avoid the vagaries of the liquidation process. It could also protect the lender from legal liability: depositors who received a return based on the bank's profits might be considered effectively partners in the bank and so exposed to unlimited liability for its debts. In Venice, formal loans to banks commonly took the form of a 'local colleganza', a common form of business borrowing. It was a notarized instrument of fixed term, usually a year, that paid a market rate determined at maturity (so avoiding any usury problems). 34
Deposit banks used the funds they obtained from deposits and loans to support a variety of assets. Overdraft lending was a natural adjunct to the banks' function of clearing and settling payments. We have seen how overdraft played a crucial role at the fairs of Champagne. It was equally important in Venice, especially in the bullion trade. 35 Merchants bringing goods to the city were required to pay customs duties immediately on arrival, before they had a chance to sell the goods to raise the necessary funds; the Rialto banks would allow them to pay their duties in bank by overdrawing their accounts.
Overdraft loans made to accommodate the payments scheduling of merchants were generally for modest amounts and of short duration. However, overdraft lending could expand beyond this to become a form of commercial loan. In such cases, loans were often large and of long and uncertain duration, and for some banks they could make up a substantial part of their outstanding assets. 36 While some commercial lending took the form of overdraft credit, most took the form of equity participation in commercial ventures: often, the bank was a silent or investing partner in a venture partnership. Banks had little choice but to invest in equity: debt instruments were unavailable, partly because of the ban on usury. 37 Bankers often 34 Mueller (1997) . See Kohn (1999d) for more on the colleganza.
35 Mueller (1979) 36 Note that this lending was volantary. Because transactions were conducted orally, overdraft was impossible without the consent of the banker. (Usher (1934) p18) illiquid; by 1600, they were routinely discounting commercial paper before maturity. 44 Discounting by banks was not itself new: there were earlier examples of discounting receivables. At the Castilian fairs of Medina del Campo (1420-1575), credit balances were due twenty days after the close of the settlement period; however, merchants who did not wish to wait were able to discount their claims with bankers at a cost of 0.5-1%. 45 In Venice, banks purchased at a discount payments of new coin from the mint due to sellers of bullion; they did the same with tax and customs receivables due to the government. 46 Like the banks of today, early deposit banks engaged in a variety of 'off-balancesheet' activities. The most common was the provision of guarantees. To attract deposits, banks needed to have excellent credit; so substituting their own credit for that of their customers, for a consideration, was a natural extension of their business. In Barcelona, banks commonly guaranteed the debts of their customers, promising to pay if the customer failed to do so. In Genoa, shipbuilders routinely required guarantees from a bank before beginning construction of a new commission. In Venice, banks began by guaranteeing the payments of customs duties by bullion importers and only later financed them with overdrafts; similarly, they began by guaranteeing government purchase contracts (to "any creditor who doubted the solvency of the government") before they started to finance them directly. 47 Other off-balance-sheet activities of deposit banks in various cities included the underwriting of maritime insurance and wagers on horse races.
They even included derivatives: the Cerchi of fifteenth-century Florence "bought and sold options to buy claims on credit in the public debt at an agreed rate anytime within a stipulated period, sometimes extending as long as eight months into the future." 48
MANAGING LIQUIDITY AND RISK
As financial intermediaries, deposit banks had the same principal concerns as banks today-liquidity and risk. They had to be able to convert their deposits into coin on demand, and they had to ensure their solvency in the face of potential losses. However, the nature of the banks and the nature of the environment in which they operated made 43 On Venice, see Mueller (1979) . Speculation in the silver market was named as a primary cause of the bank failures of 1374. 44 The evolution of discounting is discussed in detail in Kohn (1999c) .
45 Usher (1943) .
46 Mueller (1979) 47 Barcelona, Usher (1943) Ch 8; Genoa, Byrne (1930) ; Venice, Mueller (1997) p 433. managing liquidity and risk much more difficult than it is today. Banks were small; safe and liquid assets were unavailable; shocks to the economy were large and frequent; and there was no lender of last resort. 49 Banks were small primarily because the economies they served were small. In the early fourteenth century, before the Black Death decimated Europe's population, only
Venice among the great commercial centers had a population of over 100,000. Consequently, reserve ratios were much higher than they are today: a ratio of 30%
was not unusual. In addition, banks relied on balances with other banks as liquid reserves.
Small banks sometimes paid a premium to hold deposits at larger banks, on which they could draw for cash. They were sometimes allowed to overdraw these accounts-a sort of emergency credit line. In times of monetary stringency, banks resorted to all manner of tricks to avoid payment in cash. They might pay out only in low-valued 'black money' which would take a long time to count out and a cart to carry away-rather like a bank today paying only in pennies. They might shorten their hours, reducing the number of transactions they could complete. They might offer depositors inducements not to withdraw cash. It was common to send depositors from bank to bank in an often fruitless pursuit of specie. If all else failed, the banks might simply suspend convertibility-allowing depositors to continue to make payment in bank but not to withdraw cash. In Venice, suspensions were a regular occurrence. During a suspension, the value of bank money would fall relative to cash-creditors being willing to accept a smaller amount if payment were made in cash rather than in bank. Relieved of the need to convert their deposits into cash, bankers could not resist the temptation to expand their lending, and new banks opened to take advantage of the opportunity. The result was an 'inflation' of bank money: in 1526, bank money fell to a discount of 20% relative to cash.
Banks lacked safe and liquid assets in which they could invest. Primarily, this was because such assets-negotiable bills of exchange in particular-did not yet exist.
However, the prohibition of usury did not help, because it made it difficult or impossible for banks to make loans at interest. To some extent, banks found ways around the prohibition: they disguised interest as fees, or they lent in one currency against repayment in another, hiding the interest in the exchange rate (the same method used in the bill of exchange). However, the most direct way to avoid any accusation of usury was to provide finance in the form of equity rather than debt. This was a major reason why much commercial lending took the form of investment in venture partnerships. But these investments were very risky, illiquid, and of long maturity (a trading voyage could take as long as two years). Overdraft, the other main form of commercial lending, was not much better as an asset: since it was of indefinite maturity, it could not be liquidated in times of stringency. Whatever the form of commercial lending, it was generally poorly diversified-a few large investments or loans making up the bulk of a bank's assets.
Deposit banks operated in a highly unstable environment that threatened both their solvency and their liquidity. War was a major cause of instability. War, or even the threat of war, could interrupt trade for extended periods; the needs of war finance could empty a territory of coin. The prices of commodities-grain, bullion, spices-were highly volatile, and a collapse of prices could be disastrous for banks that had invested directly in commodities or that had extended loans or guarantees to speculators. The monetary environment, too, was highly unstable. 50 A general shortage of coin would increase withdrawals, depleting bank reserves. While both debasements and strengthenings caused shortages of coin, they had very different effects on bank balance sheets. Debasement was beneficial. Much of the bank's assets were 'real'-reserves of coin which could be recoined at a profit and equity investments-while most of its liabilities-mainly deposits-were 'nominal' and would therefore decline in real value as prices rose. On the death. Surety was in the form of real property posted by the banker or, more usually, guarantees provided by third parties. If the bank failed, the guarantors were liable for its debts up to a predetermined sum. 56 In Barcelona, two or more individuals, other than the banker himself, had to put up a total of 1,000 silver marks, later raised to 2,000-a substantial sum, equivalent to several million dollars in today's money. 57 In Venice the required guarantee of 3,000 ducats was raised to 20,000 in 1455 after a series of bank failures; guarantors had to post bond in the form of liquid assets, usually government securities. 58 In 1309, after a number of bank failures had led to serious friction with the merchants of the Hansa, Bruges supplemented private guarantees with a form of deposit insurance. The city made good on these guarantees in a number of cases. 59
The authorities sometimes tried to limit the risk exposure of deposit banks by restricting their assets. Venice had a long history of asset restrictions, and added new ones after each banking crisis. In the 1370s, it banned investment in most commodities (especially bullion); in the early fifteenth century, it limited investments in commercial ventures to one and a half times the personal wealth of the banker (as assessed for tax purposes). 60 A 1477 law in Flanders forbade banks "to deal in commodities or to be partners in such dealings, either at home, or overseas, or beyond the mountains." 61 Had this restriction been enforced, it would have left bankers with very little opportunity for investment.
We have seen that when their liquidity was under pressure, banks would try to avoid paying out cash. Governments enacted laws to require them to do so. Barcelona passed a law in 1444 requiring banks to pay cash within 24 hours of demand. 62 Venice passed a law in the 1470s requiring payment in cash within three days (the same law required 56 The posting of a bond was not unique to banking: it was common practice for all important public offices.
57 Riu (1979) 58 Mueller (1979) ; Mueller (1977) 59 See de Roover (1948) Ch 15. The guarantees were later extended to other nations of itinerant merchants (Nuremburg, Portugal, Spain), but not to the Italians, who were generally resident in Bruges, and so thought able to take care of themselves. In 1480, the Hanseatic merchants received similar guarantees from Antwerp, but only up to 6,000 crowns apiece.
banks to remain open at least two hours in the morning and two in the evening). 63 Moreover, the 1522 Venetian law that banned written orders of payment was largely motivated by banks' use of this instrument to avoid paying out cash. Florence passed a law in 1568 requiring banks to pay cash on demand. 64 The repeated passage of laws enforcing the convertibility of deposits suggests that these laws had little effect.
Bank failures where frequent. When a bank failed, it was liquidated by the authorities. Payments were immediately suspended and records seized. (It was not unusual in Venice for a failed banker to flee the city with the bank's books and then to negotiate personal immunity in exchange for their return.) The sureties were required to pay up, and the personal property of the banker was placed in receivership to be sold to cover the bank's debts (including those to the sureties). The liability of the banker was unlimited. Priority in liquidation varied according to custom: under Roman law, assets were divided pro rata among the creditors; under German customary law, it was first come, first served. In some cities, priority was given to certain classes of depositor, such as foreigners, or widows and orphans. If the depositors could not be repaid in full, the banker might be imprisoned to encourage his relatives to pay his debts in order to secure his release. Barcelona went a step further: a banker who failed to pay up within a year was liable to be executed. This actually happened in 1360, when Francesch Castello was beheaded in front of his bank. 65 Generally, a failed banker was permanently prohibited from opening another bank. However, Venice recognized the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity: it allowed the owner of an illiquid bank to establish a successor bank if his creditors were willing to accept payment in the form of deposits in the new bank (typically these were term deposits, payable at specified intervals). 66
D. THE CRISIS OF DEPOSIT BANKING AND THE RISE OF PUBLIC BANKS
Deposit banking seems to have undergone something of a general crisis from the second half of the fifteenth century. 67 There were waves of bank failures across 62 Usher (1943) Ch 8 63 Mueller (1997) 64 In the 1570s, Florentine banks, too, avoided paying out cash by giving customers instead polizze drawn on other banks. The decision of the Tuscan Treasury in 1576 not to accept polizze di banco in payment and to require cash instead precipitated a liquidity crisis. (Cipolla (1989)) 65 Usher (1943) p 242 Europe-notably in Venice, Florence, and Bruges. 68 The 'bullion famine', which peaked at this time, almost certainly played a role. The scarcity of coin strained the banks' liquidity and the general deflation and slump lowered the quality of their assets and threatened their solvency. Because of the harm done to banks, the effects of the bullion famine were particularly severe in places that relied upon banks for their means of payment. The collapse of banks increased the demand for coin and further exacerbated the shortage. There was also some contagion, as the market for bills of exchange transmitted tight liquidity from place to place. 69 The widespread and frequent failures of deposit banks, which continued on and off into the sixteenth century, shook the confidence of merchants and attracted the attention of governments. Efforts to regulate bank safety were clearly not working: more radical solutions seemed to be called for.
Banking failures were particularly severe in the Low Countries. The Burgundian authorities decided that the best solution was to ban banking altogether. They had embarked on a program of monetary stabilization and anyhow viewed the moneychangerbankers with a jaundiced eye, suspecting them of undermining the reforms. Beginning in 1489, the authorities issued repeated orders prohibiting the taking of deposits and payment in bank. The repetition suggests that, as usual, the prohibition was ineffective.
However, making deposit banking illegal hardly promotes depositor confidence: in addition to their normal concerns about the soundness of the bank, depositors now had to worry about confiscation by the authorities and possible fines. The result was that deposit banks completely died out in the Low Countries by the end of the fifteenth century. 70 The absence of deposit banks in Antwerp was to have profound implications for its financial development during the sixteenth century. 71 Another place where bank failures were a continuing and increasingly severe problem The Banco di Rialto, which opened for business in 1587,was designed as a pure payments institution that did not engage in financial intermediation and was therefore not subject to failure. It accepted deposits and allowed deposit transfers and cash withdrawals, but it paid no interest on its deposits and allowed no overdraft or other credit. It was clear that this would not be a profit-making enterprise, and the bank's expenses were to be paid by the government out of import duties. The management of the bank was licensed to a private individual (the normal practice for many public offices), but the bank was guaranteed by the Senate. Although private banks were not prohibited, and its problems shed some light on the 'dark side' of public banking. While the Taula was intended as a safe repository for the funds of the city and its citizens, the primary motivation for its establishment was fiscal. A petition, submitted to the city council, supporting the establishment of a municipal bank read as follows:
Certain citizens desirous of promoting the welfare of the city, have thought that if the city were to have a bonded Bank of Deposit it would be possible to place in it the deposits of the city, which amount to a considerable sum, and which it is now required, by order of the city, to place on deposit with some agent.
Furthermore, large sums would be deposited by many individuals who would prefer to keep them in such a bank rather than hold them in their own possession.
With such sums and the balances from the revenues of the city, it would be possible to redeem bonds, and in a short time reduce the annual charges to which the city is subject. 72 The intention was not, therefore, as it was later with the Banco di Rialto , to protect the payments function by preventing all bank lending. Rather, it was to direct bank lending to the government and so provide the government with a less expensive way of funding its debt.
The Taula was authorized to lend exclusively to the city and prohibited from private lending-including the granting of overdraft credit. It also acted as a fiscal agent for the city and later for the Catalan government-receiving tax payments, issuing bonds, and making interest payments. The city administered the Taula directly as a department of municipal government, and its deposits were guaranteed by the city. The guarantee proved an insufficient attraction to draw much commercial business away from the private deposit banks. Unlike them, the Taula could not provide private depositors with overdraft credit or foreign remittance through bills of exchange, and its service tended to be bureaucratic and slow. The granting to the Taula of a number of privileges-the most important being a monopoly on conditioned deposits-and even the city's attempts to suppress private banks did little to change this. Moreover, the city proved unable to resist the temptation of easy credit. It borrowed copiously from the Taula both to finance emergency purchases of grain and to cover military expenses. As lending expanded, so did the amount of the bank's deposits, and their value fell to a discount relative to cash.
By the 1460s, the Taula was forced to suspend convertibility. Deposits continued to fall in value, and the city eventually had no choice but to liquidate the bank, paying off 72 Usher (1943) p269 depositors with long-term city debt. The Taula was reorganized in 1468, this time with a restriction on its ability to lend to the city.
After Barcelona, a number of other cities set up public banks, but the idea really took off only with the establishment of the Banco di Rialto in Venice. Because of their official supervision and public guarantees, public banks had the advantage of inspiring greater confidence on the part of depositors. Indeed, they proved much less subject to failure than had private deposit banks. Moreover, because there was usually only a single public bank, there was no need for inter-bank clearing, and the payments process became much more efficient. By the end of the seventeenth century, most deposit banking on the Continent was in the hands of public banks. However, the Achilles heel of public banks remained-the temptation to finance the government with money creation-and most succumbed to it eventually.
The different approaches taken by the Low Countries and by Venice to the problems of deposit banking in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to two distinct paths of development. In the Low Countries, the ban on deposit banks threw the burden of payment back onto the assignment of private debts and led in Antwerp to the evolution of negotiable bills of exchange. This instrument provided the basis for the highly successful English country banks of the eighteenth century. In Venice, the private deposit bank was replaced by the public bank. This path led to the Wisselbank of Amsterdam, established in 1609, and to the Bank of England in 1694. The two paths were reunited in nineteenth century England, and together provided the basis for modern commercial banking. 73 
